Purpose: Miranda focuses on “procedures which assure” the 5th Amendment, not about defining the 5th amendment right, but about developing procedures to protect that right. (See Michigan v. Tucker)
Free Choice: “Free choice” in this case really means “informed choice,” or choice free from psychological torture.
Protection from Self: The privilege against self-incrimination is also a protection of the individual from himself. Therefore, he needs to know and be aware of his rights in order to be afforded that protection.
Holding/Miranda Rights: “At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent. The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used against the individual in court. An individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation. It is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to consult with an attorney, but also that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.”
- Carnley v. Cochran; No Silent Waiver: “Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected. Anything less is not a waiver.”
- Presumed Compulsion: Unmirandized statements carry with them an irrebuttable presumption of compulsion. Miranda’s bright line rule mandates exclusion of statements such as these in the prosecution’s case in chief (can be used for impeachment purposes).
Illinois v. Perkins; Undercover Officers: The Court held that encounters between suspects and undercover officers are not subject to Miranda, noting that “warnings are not required when the suspect is unaware that he is speaking to a law enforcement officer and gives a voluntary statement.
Harris v. New York; Cross-Examination: Court held that statements taken in violation of Miranda cold be used to impeach a defendant’s testimony (just not in the prosecution’s case-in-chief).
New Jersey v. Portash; Coerced Statements May Not be Used at All: The Court held that “a defendant’s compelled statements, as opposed to statements taken in violation of Miranda, may not be put to any testimonial use against him in a criminal trial.” (violation of the pristine 5th Amendment).
New York v. Quarles; Public Safety Exception: “We hold that on these facts there is a ‘public safety’ exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect’s answers may be admitted into evidence, and that the availability of that exception does not depend upon the motivation of the individual officers involved.
- Reasoning: The need for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination. In this situation, officers would act in interest of their own safety, and the safety of others. The doctrinal underpinnings of Miranda do not require its application in situations where police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a large concern for the public safety.
Oregon v. Elstad: Fruit of the poisonous tree analysis if for 4th Amendment only, not for Miranda violations ( or in the 5th Amendment context generally).
- Reasoning: This was a noncoercive Miranda violation, so neither the 5th Amendment nor the Due Process Clause was violated by the officers (no compulsion). So the unmirandized statements may not be used in case-in-chief but do not serve as a poisonous tree to taint the subsequent statement given after the Miranda warnings have been given to the defendant.
- Interesting Question: If a statement was obtained in violation of Miranda, and the DPC or 5th Amendment, maybe a poisonous tree analysis is called for because there is a constitutional violation (Court hasn’t answered this question).
Missouri v. Seibert; Question-First Interrogation Method: “Because the question-first tactic effectively threatens to thwart Miranda’s purpose of reducing the risk that a coerced confession would be admitted, and because the facts here do not reasonably support a conclusion that the warnings given could have served their purpose, Seibert’s post-warning statements are inadmissible.”
- Reasoning: Because this midstream recitation of warnings after an interrogation and unwarned confession could not effectively comply with Miranda’s constitutional requirement, we hold that a statement repeated after a warning in such circumstances is inadmissible. When Mirada warnings are inserted in the midst of coordinated and continuing interrogation, they are likely to mislead and “deprive a defendant of knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and consequences of abandoning them.”
When Does Miranda Attach Berkemer v. McCarty; Miranda Custody: Miranda applies when “a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Also, Miranda applies to misdemeanors.
- Test for Custody: Whether a reasonable person would understand that “he was subjected to restraints comparable to those associated with a formal arrest.” (requires more than temporary seizure but not necessarily formal arrest).
- Exceptions: Traffic stops are not Miranda-triggering (these are more similar to Terry stops). Miranda warnings also aren’t necessary to ask for names or registration.
- Reasoning: First, detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief, lasting only a few minutes. Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that the motorist feels at the mercy of the police. Indeed, a traffic stop presents a substantially less “police dominated” encounter than a stationhouse arrest (it’s semi-public, and people can see the officer’s actions).
- Important Note: There is a difference between an inherent power imbalance and a coerced confession.
Rhode Island v. Innis; Miranda Interrogation: “We conclude that the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either (1) express questioning or (2) its functional equivalent. That is to say, the term ‘interrogation,’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police officer (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.”
- Objective Test: This is an objective test. Subjective intent doesn’t matter.
Waiving Miranda North Carolina v. Butler; Miranda Waiver: “If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel.”
- The Waiver Standard: “The question is not one of form, but rather whether the defendant in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights delineated in the Miranda case.”
- Implied Waiver: “The courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights; the prosecution’s burden is great; but in at least some cases waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions of the person interrogated. The defendant’s silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver, may support a conclusion that a defendant waived his rights.”
- But See Berghuis v. Thompkins: An interrogation need not cease until a suspect has expressly invoked either the right (1) to remain silent or (2) an attorney.
The Right to Counsel; Invoking Miranda Rule from Miranda: If a suspect requests counsel, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.
Edwards v. Arizona: (1) When an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during a custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights.
- (2) When an accused has expressed his desire to deal with police only through counsel, he is not subject to further interrogation until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.
- Oregon v. Bradshaw: A “defendant-initiated” conversation has to be “indicating a desire on the part of the accused to open up a more generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation.”
Davis v. United States; Invoke Unambiguously: The suspect must unambiguously request counsel in a way where a reasonable officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.
- Remember Berghuis v. Thompkins: An interrogation need not cease until a suspect has expressly invoked either the right to remain silent or an attorney.
Example; Minnick v. Mississippi: Suspect invokes right to counsel, leaves custody for the weekend and consults counsel twice, returns Monday at the command of police and without counsel makes incriminating statements.
- Holding: Court held this violated the right to counsel under the 5th Amendment.
Maryland v. Shatzer; Two Week Rule: An invocation of the right to counsel lasts for two weeks, and must be renewed.
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel 5th Amendment: Really for self-incrimination, and lawyers can help with this during interrogation. The defendant must affirmatively invoke the right to counsel, and waiver of the right may be implied (during the investigative phase).
6th Amendment: Begins when criminal proceedings have begun. The right to counsel does not depend upon a request by the defendant, and courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.
- Powell v. Alabama: “The Court noted that during perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings that is to say, from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial, when consultation, thorough-going investigation and preparation are vitally important, the defendants are as much entitled to such aid of counsel during that period as at the trial itself.”
Massiah v. United States: It is a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel if police deliberately elicit incriminating statements from a defendant in the absence of counsel after the adversary process commences.
- Reasoning: If the right to counsel was to have any efficacy it must apply to indirect and surreptitious interrogations as well as those conducted in the jailhouse. In this case, Massiah was more seriously imposed upon because he didn’t even know that he was under interrogation by a government agent. While the police may still conduct investigation of the suspected criminal after indictment, the defendant’s own incriminating statements, obtained by federal agents under the circumstances here disclosed, may not constitutionally be used by the prosecution as evidence against him at his trial.
Brewer v. Williams; Sixth Amendment Waiver: The state must prove an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.
- Inferences Drawn in Favor of Defendant: If the defendant has not clearly waived his right, the court takes all inferences of ambiguity in favor of the defendant and non-waiver.
- Express: Your waiver under the 6th Amendment must be express and unequivocal.
- Seriousness of Crime Doesn’t Matter: The severity of the crime should not be a factor in whether your 4th, 5th, or 6th Amendment rights were violated.